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Algebraic Theory of Pareto Efficient Exchange 
 
Abstract 
We study pure exchange economies with symmetries on preferences up to taste intensity 
transformations.  In a 2-person, 2-good endowment economy, we show that bilateral symmetry on  
each utility functional precludes a rectangle in the Edgeworth box as the location of Pareto optimal 
allocations.  Under strictly quasi-concave preferences, a larger set can be ruled out.  The 
inadmissible region is still larger when preferences are homothetic and identical up to taste intensity 
parameters.  Symmetry also places bounds on the relations between terms of trade and efficient 
allocation.  The inferences can be extended to an n-person, m-good endowment economy under 
generalized permutation group symmetries on preferences. 
  
JEL classification: D51, D61, C60 
 
KEYWORDS: bilateral symmetry, general equilibrium, group majorize, homothetic preferences, 
permutation groups, taste differences, terms of trade.1.  INTRODUCTION 
SYMMETRY AND MARKET EXCHANGE ARE INTIMATELY related phenomena.  Market transactions are 
motivated by asymmetries in tastes or endowments.  Absent transactions costs, these asymmetries 
are exploited through exchange where the terms of trade are invariant to the parties involved.  
Consequently, in a pure exchange economy there should be fundamental structural relationships 
between the nature of heterogeneities among consumers, equilibrium decisions by consumers, and 
the equilibrium prices that guide these decisions.  Our interest is in identifying and characterizing 
how heterogeneities in consumer tastes over the set of available goods affect general equilibrium.  
We show that particular forms of heterogeneities among consumers imply that certain consumption 
bundles cannot be supported in equilibrium regardless of consumer income levels.  The reason is 
because the terms of trade to support these equilibria are inconsistent with consumer preferences, 
when considered collectively. 
To identify cardinal aspects of general equilibrium relationships in a pure exchange economy it 
is necessary to employ tools that model the structure of similarities and dissimilarities in 
preferences and endowments.  Mathematical science provides a number of related tools, such as the 
theories of group structures and vector majorization, to model structural symmetries.  These tools 
have been used elsewhere in economics.  Work by Koopmans, Diamond, and Williamson (1964) 
invoked an analogy with group structures on invariant measures to understand consumption 
preferences over time.  Sato (1977, 1981) and others have found a number of applications in the 
theory of dual structures.  The role of symmetries in index number theory was apparent to 
Samuelson and Swamy (1974) some 30 years ago.  In related research, the group structures 
underlying aggregators have received some attention since then by Vogt and Barta (1997), among others.
1  In trade theory, Samuelson (2001) has applied symmetry to facilitate the numerical 
accounting of gains from trade when comparing the Ricardo and Sraffa models. 
Majorization, a pre-ordering on vectors that relies on complete symmetry, has been applied by 
Atkinson (1970) in the study of income dispersion and social equity.  Since risk may be viewed as a 
dispersion attribute on a random variable, it is not surprising that majorization relations should also 
arise in considerations of decision making under uncertainty.  Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) and, in 
a more general framework, Chambers and Quiggin (2000) have used versions of the concept to 
analyze comparative statics under risk. 
General equilibrium has also been subjected to group-oriented analyses.  Balasko (1990) has 
observed that sunspot equilibria may be interpreted as broken symmetries in general equilibrium 
that arise due to market incompleteness.  This observation allows for a more comprehensive 
characterization of admissible equilibria.  While we also seek to understand the nature of general 
equilibrium, our purpose is more microeconomic in flavor.  From a methodological perspective, 
Hennessy and Lapan (2003a, 2003b), who studied firm-level production decisions (2003a) and 
investor-level portfolio allocation decisions (2003b), provide the most direct links to the approach 
that we will take.  Their analyses exploit the symmetries of a functional when a group acts on the 
functional’s arguments.  Contradictions then generate bounds on optimal decision vectors.  
The present analysis is also built upon the contradictions that symmetries can generate.  Section 
2 focuses on a 2-agent, 2-good pure exchange economy.  There, we use group invariances to show 
that when monotone utility functions are bilaterally symmetric up to symmetry-breaking scale 
parameters then conditions exist such that one rectangle in the Edgeworth box must be eliminated as 
candidate solutions for an efficient equilibrium.  These conditions pertain to the relative strength of 
                                                           
1 Fixed point theorems have an algebraic structure.  While algebraic topology has been applied to 
better understand Nash equilibria, as in Herings and Peeters (2001), the research does not appear to 
  2preferences and the relative scarcity of endowments.  If, in addition to bilateral symmetry, the utility 
functions are quasi-concave then two further results may be obtained.  First, the inadmissible region 
in the allocation box may be expanded to include two additional contiguous triangles.  Second, use 
of majorization theory demonstrates that the equilibrium terms of trade must bear a particular 
relationship with the equilibrium consumption point.  If, aswell, it is assumed that preferences are 
homothetic, are identical apart from taste intensity parameters, and possess an elasticity of 
substitution less than unity, then the inadmissible region can be shown to be larger still.  When 
considered separately, neither identical preferences nor homothetic preferences support a larger 
precluded region. 
In the remainder of the paper the inferences arising from the bilateral symmetry context of 
Section 2 are extended to a multi-good, multi-consumer pure exchange economy under generalized 
symmetry structures.  The most obvious extension, and the one which we make, is to finite 
permutation groups, i.e., utility functional invariances under permutations of a finite number of 
arguments. 
 
2.  MOTIVATION 
2.1.  2×2 Model 




Person 1 has the composite utility function UT  while Person 2 has utility 
.  The functions Tq, Tq, Tq, and Tq are     
continuously differentiable, monotone increasing maps, while the functionals U  and U
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have appealed to any underlying fundamental symmetries. 
  32 →    .  All are strictly increasing (i.e., monotone or non-satiated) and once continuously 
differentiable.  There is no waste in allocation and the goods are scarce, so that efficiency requires 
both  1, 2, aa q += a qq  and  1, 2, bb qq q += b .  The sorts of question that we are interested in involve what 
can be inferred about Pareto efficient divisions of  a q  and  b q
2 } =
, as well as how prices and quantities 





Further assumptions are clearly necessary.  Because Pareto efficiency requires the exhaustion of 
exchange opportunities that arise from consumer heterogeneities, the assumptions will involve 
restrictions on how goods substitute within a consumer’s basket of purchases.  The restrictions we 
employ involve symmetries that place structure on a consumer’s iso-utility trade-offs.  Pareto 
improving re-allocations can then be identified by using symmetries to hold the utility level of one 
consumer constant while freeing up endowments to make the other consumer better off. 
Asymmetries are necessary to model taste differences, while it is necessary to modularize the 
asymmetries if meaningful insights are to be found.  For the moment, we model these asymmetries 
through the superscripted T  functions.  The structure on the symmetries are modeled through the 
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To illustrate, model the superscripted T( ) ⋅  functions as ray linear; Tq , 
, where the 
,
,, , () ,
ia
ia ia ia qi θ =∈
,, , , ib ib qi θ =∈ θ  values are strictly positive, symmetry-breaking, taste 
intensity heterogeneities.  The central concept in our analysis is the notion of invariance, and this 
example will show how to use the invariances that arise from symmetries when developing 
inferences about efficient allocations.  Our present interest is in exploiting the invariances of the 
two functions Uq  and Uq .  The ratios 
1
1, 1, [, aa1, 1, bb q θθ ]
2
2, 2, 2, [, aa bb q θθ 2, 11 ,1 , / ab z θ θ =  and  2 z = 
2, 2, / ab θ θ  are clearly important in this regard because they gauge a consumer’s personal relative 
2 Ω
2 Ω
  4intensity of preference for good A.  Ratio  / qb zq q a =  should also be important because it measures 
the relative economy-wide scarcity of good A. 
 
2 z
aa q δ =
 
2.2.  Symmetric and Monotone Utility 
Denote the set of Pareto efficient allocations as Q with sample elements given by the allocation 
2-vector {( , where “'” is the vector transpose operation.  The endowment 
constraint determines two of the points in this quadruple.  Apart from singularities arising from any 
of the relations  ,  , or 
1, 1, 2, 2, , )',( , )'} ab ab qq qq      
1 q zz = 2 q zz = 1 z = , there are essentially two contexts to be considered.  
When   then person 1 (person 2) has a stronger comparative preference for good A than 
does person 2 (person 1).  Without further loss of generality, and ignoring equality in relative 
preference intensities for the moment, we may assign the order  . 
12 () zz ><
12 zz >
Upon, again, ignoring singularities that will be studied separately, we may assume that either 
 or  .  Defining  21 (,) q zz z ∈ 21 [, q zz z ∉ ] 1,a q    and  1,bb q b q δ =   , the endowment constraints require 
2, (1 a ) qq a a δ =−    and q2,b   (1 ) b qb δ =− .  After applying some symbol manipulations to exploit the 
invariances, it is clear that bilateral symmetry in the utility functionals imply 
1
1, 1, [, aaa bbb θδ θδ ] q Uq  
1
1,ab Uq θδ = 1 1, 1 , baa zq θδ [/ b ] z .  Denoting the bundle indifference relation by   and identifying 
vectors 
∼
1 (,) ' aa bb cq q δ δ =
 
,  1 c
+ =
 
1 , aa q z 1 ) ' (/ bb qz δ δ , we have c 11 c
+    
∼ .  Similarly, if we define  2 c =
 
 
((1 ) ,( aa 1 ) b qq )' b δ δ − −  and  22 ((1 ) aa z δ =− − 2 )' q z ) bb / ,(1 δ cq , then 
+  
2 c 2 c
+    
∼ .  However, and this is 
the foundation of our analysis, if the pair {, 12 cc }
+ +    




  5Our interest is in ascertaining the feasibility of certain points so that a determination can be 
made as to whether the point could be Pareto efficient.  To this end we define convex combinations 
of iso-utility bundles.  Restrict  2 [0,1], i i λ ∈∈ Ω
≠
, and define the semi-norm 
(2.1)        
12121 2 ( , , , , , ) 1 whenever 0, 0,
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vq .  If 
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 for some 
reallocation of endowments that weakly increases all utility levels, then the candidate allocation 
 cannot be Pareto efficient for utilities that are strictly monotone.  1, {( , 1, 2, 2, )',( , )'} ab ab qq qq      
When all we know of the utility functions are that they are symmetric and monotone, then 
invariance only allows us to make deductions for the lattice points of the unit square,  12 (, )
lp λλ ∈Λ  
.  When, in addition, strict quasi-concavity is known to hold then we may 
seek violations on any   where ch
{(0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1)} =
(, 12 ) ( )[ 0 , 1 ][ 0 , 1 ]
lp ch λλ ∈Λ = × () ⋅  is the convex hull set operation. 
The comparisons in (2.1) reduce to the assertion that  ( ) 1 D ⋅ =  whenever 
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and one does not bind.  Clearly the critical parameters are  11 / q rz z =  and  22 / q rz z = .  On 
lp Λ , i.e., 
for monotone, symmetric utilities only, then  ( ) 1 D ⋅ =  if  
(2.3)         12
12
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where one inequality is strict.  The solution interval is non-degenerate only if rr  
.  Consequently, when all we know about preferences is that they are symmetric and 
1, 1, ; ij i >< ≠
2 , ij ∈Ω
  6monotone then the only allocations that may be excluded are (for  ) the Edgeworth box 
points defined by  
1 1 r >>
(0, b Q =
2, 2 2, a b z θ =
1[0,0]
2 r













with one inequality strict. 
The situation is depicted in Figure 1, where  (, 0 aa ) Qq =  and  ).  The line  1, L1: b q =  
1, 1, 1, 1 1, / aa b a qz q θ θ =  from O1, the consumer 1 origin, gives the locus of consumption bundles that are 
invariant under the iso-utility symmetry for that consumer.  These are the bundles that sit on the 
consumer 1 axis of symmetry (AS1).  The line  2, 2, 2, L2: ba qq / a q θ =  performs the same role 
for consumer 2.  The lines Li are rays from the origin Oi because U  is invariant to 
permutation on the arguments.  The conditions r  require that these two AS lines intersect in 
the interior of the box and to the northwest of the diagonal (denoted by L3) between the two origins.  
The point of intersection is given by  
12 1 r >>
b q
(2.5)        
22
12 12













so that (2.4) may be interpreted as the pair of requirements  ˆˆ , aa bb δ δδ δ ≤ ≥ .  
Under these conditions we may rule out all points except the southeastern vertex, Y, of the 
northwestern rectangle in the Edgeworth box.  The rectangle is depicted in Figure 1.  The intuition 
is that for any point inside this inadmissible region there is a point somewhere else in the Edgeworth 
box such that both consumers are as well off while at least one of the resource constraints is slack.  
The vertex Y is special because it is the unique fixed point where the known invariances of both 
consumer utilities do not even alter the values of either bundle.  Due to these invariances on the 
  7bundles, no opportunity can exist to exploit opportunities that arise from invariances on the iso-
utility curves. 
For a more detailed version of the argument, pick a candidate equilibrium point 
 that happens to be in the inadmissible region of the Edgeworth box.  There 
, as measured from O1, coincides with  , as measured from O2.  The points must 
coincide for a Pareto efficient equilibrium under strict monotonicity.  The map   
, with qq  and 
1, 1, 2, 2, {( , )',( , )'} ab ab qq qq      
1, 1, (,) ab qq   
1, 1, ˆˆ (,) ab qq 1, 1, ˆ a =  
2, 2, (, ab qq    )
z z
1, 1, (,) ab qq→   
1 / b 1, 1, 1 ˆ ba qq =  
2, 2 / ab z =  
, is also provided in the diagram.  The linear map 
, with qq  and  2, 2, 2, 2, ˆˆ (,)(, ab ab qq qq →    ) 2, ˆ 2, 2, 2 ˆ b qq a z =   , is distinct, and so one must be careful 
that the endowment budgets are not broken.  In matrix form, these maps are given as 
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The endowment constraints are not broken because the slope (really an arc marginal rate of 
substitution) for map  , being  1, 1, 1, 1, ˆˆ (,)(, ab ab qq qq →    1 z − , differs from the slope for map (,  
,  .  The supermodular nature of the transformations, 
2, 2, ab qq    )
2, 2, ˆˆ (, ab qq → ) 2 z − q θ , ensures that resources are 
freed up.  The  released resources are represented by the vector between the map image points in 
Figure 1.  
 
2.3.  Allocation Under Strictly Quasi-concave Utility 
At this point we make the additional assumption that both utility functions are strictly quasi-
concave so that the level sets are strictly convex and any equilibrium is unique.  Symmetry, together 
  8with continuous differentiability and quasi-concavity imply that the Schur condition holds,
2  
(2.7)          
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12 ([ ] [ ] ) ( )0 ,




where   represents the derivative with respect to the functional’s j
th argument.  With scaling 
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Notice that, due to continuity, U 1 [] []
i U ⋅ =⋅  on the respective AS lines under quasi-concavity so 
that the marginal rates of substitution along the AS lines are given by  
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We see that the marginal rates of substitution are constant along an axis of symmetry.  The 
symmetry assumption, together with the scalar structure of the transformation functions, impose a 
local form of ray homotheticity on preference structures.  The importance of strict quasi-concavity 
lies in the fact that any interior convex combinations of iso-utility points are Pareto improving, if 
feasible. 
Returning to the program provided in (2.2) and now choosing over any (,  
, some manipulation of (2.2) shows that allocations adhering to 
12 ) ( )
lp ch λλ ∈Λ
[0,1] [0,1] ×
(2.10)       
21 1 12 2 22 1
12 2
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ,
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with one strict, constitute a violation of Pareto efficiency on the part of candidate optimum  
.  Obviously the pair of inequalities is always satisfied when  1, 1, 2, 2, {( , )',( , )'} ab ab qq qq       12 1 λ λ == , i.e., 
                                                           
2 See Marshall and Olkin (1979, p. 57 and p. 69).  See Chambers and Quiggin (2000) for economic 
applications of the condition. 
  9when there is zero displacement along either arc between an initial consumption bundle and an iso-
utility bundle.  
If we assume that r , then we need only consider two cases: r  and   where we 
identify the common ratio as  .  For the latter case the interval in (2.10) that r  must satisfy is 
degenerate.  In that case, it is clear that the set of points 
1 r ≥ 2 2 2 1 r > 1 rr =
r 2
( , ) ab δ δ  satisfying   in (2.1) has 
positive measure if and only if 
( ) 1 ⋅= D
1 M  and  2 M  have the same sign, i.e., the only possible Pareto 
efficient solutions are such that  12 MM 0 <  or  1 MM 2 0 = = .  Thus, with rr 12 r = = , the following 
allocations are the only potential Pareto efficient allocations:
3 
(2.11)       
( ) 1: all allocations such that ( ) ( ) (( 1) ),
( ) 1: all allocations such that ( ),
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All allocations not satisfying these bounds may be excluded.  Observe that the most informative 
situation arises in case (b) when both taste intensity indices equal the index of relative scarcity, i.e., 
.  Then the Pareto efficient locus must be the main diagonal.  In both cases (a) and (c) the 
remaining admissible region is a parallelogram between the axes of symmetry.  
12 1 rr ==
Turning to the situation where r , the set of solutions ruled out by (2.10) under strict quasi-
concavity is empty if   or if 
1 r >
1 0 M > 2 0 M M >>
1 r >
.  We may, however exclude all points such that 
both   and  .  In summary, if   then all points  1 0 M ≤ 2 M 0 ≤ 2 r ( , ) [0,1] [0,1] ab δ δ ∈ ×  such that  
(2.12)        [ ] 12 2 max , 1 ba a rr r δδ δ ≥+ −






3 To conserve on space we have not drawn the associated regions.  However, we encourage the 
interested reader to do so. 
4 Notice that  12 2 /( 1 ) / bb rr r δ δ =+ − = δ  defines point Y as given in Figure 1. 
  10Another approach to establishing (2.12) is to note that all points such that the marginal rates of 
substitution across consumers are not equal can be precluded.  From (2.8) and (2.9) we have  




1, 1 1, 1, 1, 1
1 1 []  f i x e d
1, 2 1, 1, 1,
2
2, 2 2, 2, 2, 2
2 2 []  f i x e d
2, 1 2, 2, 2,
[]
| ( ) whenever ( )1,
[]
[] (1 )
| ( ) whenever ( )1.
[] ( 1 )
ba a a a
U
ab b b q b
ba a a a
U














−= ≥ ≤ ≡ ≤ ≥
∂⋅
∂⋅ −






Upon requiring  , the bounds in (2.13) also deliver (2.12).  1 zz >
If, instead, we knew that  , i.e.,  1 rr = 1 zz =  as in (2.11), then a larger region in the Edgeworth 
box could be precluded.  Then we may rule out points such that  
(2.14)       













as well as those such that 
(2.15)       













The geometry of the excluded region depends upon the magnitudes of the   relative to unity.  
The situation for   is depicted in Figure 2.  We leave it to the interested reader to study the 
other cases.  The dashed parallel lines are tangents to some isoquant along that utility function’s AS 
line.  Because the AS lines intersect inside the box, at Y, it is clear from (2.9) above that the 
tangents on the AS lines must intersect to the north of L1 and to the west of L2.  But then any point 
to the north of L1 and west of L2 cannot be efficient because the utility indifference curves cannot 
be tangent there, i.e., 
i r
1 1 r >>
1,
2 r
/ b 1, 2, 2, / ab a θ θθ θ − −< .  For any given pair of AS, this trapezoid is larger than 
the area that was precluded in Figure 1.  The quasi-concavity assumption buys us the difference, 
namely two right-angled triangles each with a vertex at point Y. 
  11A geometric interpretation of quasi-concavity is that, to exclude a point, we only need to know 
that some point on the line segment connecting the original consumption point for person 2 with its 
reflection lies to the northeast of some point on the comparable line segment for person 1.  Suppose 
that point   in Figure 2 is posited as being Pareto efficient.  It lies outside the excluded rectangle 
given in Figure 1, but it satisfies condition (2.12).  To see why it can be excluded, observe the 
point’s reflections through the two axes.  For person 1 the reflected point is  , while for person 2 
it is  '.  While   and   are not comparable, a point on the segment  ' does lie to the 
northeast of a point on the line segment  .  This means that by giving each person some convex 
combination of his original point and its reflection, a surplus of goods can be created.  But at these 
same convex combinations the respective consumers are at least weakly better off, and so the 
original point can be precluded as a Pareto efficient equilibrium under strictly monotone utilities. 
K
' K
' ' K ' K '' K KK
' KK
 
2.4.  Generalized Transformations 
While scale transformations are convenient for describing the symmetry structures, all the 
observations thus far generalize to a larger set of transformations.  Define   and label 
the inverse relation as    .  Then bilateral symmetry in an utility 
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  12fails because otherwise an utility-preserving endowment surplus would exist. 
To identify Pareto inefficient points under symmetry and monotonicity only, let equations 
(2.18)       
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implicitly define a vector-valued function of  1, 1, (, ab qq ′ ′  on the non-empty, compact, convex set 
[, 0 ] [ 0 , a q × ] b q .  If the function, and for both arguments, is continuous and into then Brouwer’s fixed 
point theorem is satisfied (MasColell, Whinston, and Green (1995, p. 952)) and a fixed point exists 
in the Edgeworth box.  If, in addition, one function is strictly increasing and the other is strictly 
decreasing then there exists an inadmissible rectangle interior to the Edgeworth box.  These 
monotonicity conditions are satisfied whenever one of 
(2.19)       
2, 2, 1, 1,
1, 2, 1, 2,
() () () ()
[0,min[ , ]]; [0,min[ , ]];
() ( ) () ( )
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holds, where tq .  The rectangle has 
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,, () () /
ij ij
ij ij ij d Tq d q = 1, 1, (, ab qq ′ ′  as one vertex, is bounded by 
the axes, and cannot contain a consumer origin. 
The analysis in Section 2.3 can also be extended to the more general context.  Since U1[]
i ⋅ = 
 on the AS lines, the marginal rates of substitution along the AS lines are given by   2[]
i U ⋅
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ia = Tq.  Section 2.3 may now be 
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The properties of strict quasi-concavity, strict monotonicity, differentiability, and bilateral 
  13symmetry (on the functional) also allow us to make deductions about equilibrium prices.  In general 
equilibrium, (2.20) implies that 
(2.21)       
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for Pareto efficient points so that (2.8) modifies to  
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upon imposing general equilibrium efficiency conditions.  Thus, attending any solution (,  
are constraints on the equilibrium price ratio  . 
,, ia ib qq    )
/ ba PP
To this point we have not imposed the assumption of homotheticity, a property that has long 
been exploited in studies of efficiency.  It is, however, true that our assumptions require local 
homotheticity along a ray.  Homotheticity carries with it strong structure on symmetries among 
consumption bundles.  The subsection to follow addresses the question of what, in addition to that 
already established about Pareto efficient bundles, homotheticity allows us to assert. 
 
2.5.  Allocation under Strictly Quasi-concave and Homothetic Utility 
As one might expect, the imposition of homotheticity can further winnow down the set on 
which the efficient solution might live.  The argument concerns a comparison of slopes away from 
the axes of symmetry.  We have  
(2.23)        1
1
1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 1
11 1 1 []  f i x e d




b a aa bb aa a
U
a b aa bb bb b
dq U q q q r
zx x
dq U q q q
θθ θ θ δ
φ ,
θ θθ θ δ
⋅ −= = ≡ =  
  14where   is the marginal rate of substitution function with respect to the transformed ‘goods’ 
1() φ ⋅
a 1, 1, a q θ  and  1, 1, b q b θ , and where homotheticity has been used to express the ratio in terms of relative 
consumption.  If we also assume that Person 2 has a homothetic utility function, then we have  
(2.24)        2
2
2, 2, 1 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 2
22 2 2 []  f i x e d




b a aa bb aa a
U
a b aa bb bb b
dq U q q q r
zx x
dq U q q q
θθ θ θ δ
φ
θθ θ θ δ
⋅
−





with   as the marginal rate of substitution function with respect to transformed ‘goods’ 
2() φ ⋅ 2, 2, aa q θ  
and  2, 2, bb q θ . 
Following the earlier analysis we would like to identify a domain on which the marginal rates of 
substitution cannot be common across the consumers.  In this regard it appears that identical 
preferences, where we mean that UT , by itself does not help.  Similarly, 
homotheticity by itself does not help.  However, with the assumption of identical and homothetic 
preferences, so that bilateral symmetry then implies 
12 ( ', '') ( ', '') T UTT ≡
(1)
12 (1) 1 φφ = = , we can conclude: 
(2.25)        12
1, 2,
12 12 [ ] fixed [ ] fixed
1, 2,







⋅⋅ >− > − ≤
2
 
We cannot extend the deduction to the half-space  1 x x >  because we do not know how rapidly the 
marginal rate of substitution declines. 
To summarize the consequences of (2.25), if  1 zz 2 =  then we have the well-known conclusion: 
under identical and homothetic preferences all allocations other than the main diagonal may be 
excluded as Pareto inefficient points.  This is because (2.25) then provides  12 x x ≤  and  12 x x ≥  
where  12 x x =  defines the main diagonal.  Instead, if   then we can exclude the set defined by  1 z > 2 z
















  15An inspection of (2.5) reveals that 
*
1 () b r a δ δ ≥≤  according as  ˆ () aa δ δ ≤ ≥ , while we also have that 
 according as 
*
2 () 1 ba r δδ ≥≤ +−2 r ˆ () aa δ δ ≥≤ .  Put another way, we can write 
** () bb a δ δδ =  and make 
the following observations.  The function passes through the point  ˆˆ (,) ab δ δ .  It crosses L1 just once 
on the interior, and from above as  a δ  increases.  The function also crosses L2 just once (again at 
ˆˆ (,) ab δ δ ) on the interior, but from below as  a δ  increases.  Partitioning the decision space, these 
observations require 





ˆ () ( 1







≤⇒ + − ≥ ≥





Upon imposing the weaker of the two inequalities in either direction we have  
(2.28)       
*
12 2 12 2 max[ , 1 ] min[ , 1 ] aa b aa rr r rr r δδ δ δδ + −≥≥ + − 
regardless of the evaluation of  a δ .  Comparing with the bound in (2.12),  b δ ≥ 
12 2 max[ , 1 ] aa rr r δ δ +− , the joint impositions of identical homothetic U (
i ) ⋅  does (weakly at any rate) 
extend the set of excludable points on ( , ) [0,1] [0,1] ab δ δ ∈ × . 
Whether the additional assumptions do lead to a ruling out of a strictly larger area depends upon 
where the efficiency locus occurs relative to the principal diagonal.  This is because with 
homothetic preferences it is well-known that the efficiency locus cannot cut the diagonal, i.e., it 
either coincides with the diagonal or only the end points are common.  If   then the efficiency 
locus is the main diagonal.  Relative to this benchmark and for a given pair of allocation vectors, 
suppose we then increase the value of  .  The effect is to increase the marginal rate of substitution 
for person 1 whenever the elasticity of substitution exceeds unity, and to decrease the marginal rate 
whenever the elasticity is less than unity.  For   we see then that the efficiency locus must be 




  16above the principal diagonal whenever the elasticity of substitution is less that unity.  In that case, 
(2.26) combines with the diagonal to provide tight bounds on the set of Pareto efficient points.  
However, when the elasticity of substitution is greater than unity then the efficiency locus will be 
below the main diagonal and (2.26) bears no information. 
At this juncture we turn back to the issue of generalizing our analysis.  A generalization of the 
transformations, as in subsection 2.4, is not the only way in which our model of pure exchange 
equilibrium can be extended.  While we could further extend the set of transformations that can be 
studied, the emphasis in the remains of this paper will be to extend our insights thus far to an 
arbitrary finite good, finite person exchange economy.  Before doing so, however, we will provide a 
brief overview of the permutation groups we will use to accommodate the wider variety of 
symmetries that can arise in larger dimensioned economies. 
 
3.  GROUP ALGEBRA 
The symmetries assumed in Section 2 may seem natural in a 2×2 pure exchange economy 
because there are only two ways of internally exchanging two goods.  This is not true, however, 
when three or more goods are available for consumption.  When there are three goods, A, B, and C, 
then there are several ways in which utility functional UT  can be left 
invariant upon interchanging arguments.
5  These include the interchanges TT , TT  
, and TT .  It is clear that as the number of goods entering the utility 
function increases, the set of invariances that may arise increases at a much greater rate.  Further, 
,,,
,, [ ( ), ( ), ( )]
ii a i b i c
ia ib ic q T q T q
,, ia ib ↔
,
,
                                                          
,, ia ib ↔
, ic T ↔
,,, ia ib ic ia TT →→→
 
}
5 We consider only permutations on the argument set {,  where arguments cannot be 
combined. 
,,, ,
ia ib ic TTT
  17these symmetries may differ across consumer utility functions.  Group theory allows for a general 
treatment of these invariances and their implications for Pareto efficient equilibria.
6 
 
DEFINITION 3.1:  A group, G , is a set of elements, G with cardinality     G
G
, together with a 
single-valued binary operation, *, such that the structure satisfies all of:  I) closure; G is closed with 
respect to *,  II) identity element; ∃∈  such that  eG * * ge eg g g = =∀
G
∈,  III) inverse elements; 
 there exists an unique element, labeled  gG ∀∈
1 g
− ∈ , such that 
11 * g g e
−− * gg= = ,  IV) 
associativity; (*  where the operations in parentheses occur 
first. 
12 3 1 ) * , gg g g 1 * g 23 (*) gg =∀ 2 , g 3 g G ∈
 
It should by now be clear as to how we will employ group algebra; the arguments of an utility 
functional comprise a set on which the group acts.  The elements of a group are not the utility 
functional arguments, but rather the operations on the functional arguments that leave the utility 
level invariant.  Define   where  .  In our notation we write that 
 whenever group element (i.e., operation) g replaces a function’s k
th argument with its l
th 
argument.  In this way the group can be viewed as a set bijection 




ik kT q )
m
() gk l =
( ) m g Ω =Ω , i.e.,  ( ) m gk l = ∈Ω  
.    m k ∀∈ Ω
 
EXAMPLE 3.1 (Dihedral 4 group): Suppose person 1 has a scale-transformed utility function on 
four goods, A, B, C, and D, where utility is known to have two invariances.  These are the group 
operation  , which represents the permutation Uq   1 g
1
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, [,,, aa bb cc dd q q q θθθθ ≡ ]
                                                           
6 Useful treatments of the groups applied in this paper can be found in Hungerford (1974) and 
  181
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, [,, , bb cc dd aa Uq q q q θθθθ
1





, and the group operation  , which represents the permutation 
.
7  Clearly the invariances cannot 
end at this point because  , i.e., Uq
4 g
1, c q θθ
1,b q
1
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, ] [,,, bb aa c dd Uq q q θθ ≡
1 *g
1
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, [,,, aa b cc q θθθ 1, 1, dd q θ ≡ 
, must also be true.  To ensure closure, as required by the definition, 
we must also have an element  , an element 
1
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, [, ,, cc dd aa bb Uq q q q θθθθ ]
51 4 * gg g = 74 * 1 g gg = , and so on.  In this way we see 
that the elements   and   generate a group upon iteration until closure occurs.  This group is the 
dihedral 4 group, best known as the group of symmetries on the square.  In addition to the above 
defined elements and to the identity e, there are 
1 g 4 g
3 1 1 g g g 1 ** g =  and  64 * gg 2 g = .  The complete 
table of group element compositions, often called the Cayley Table, is given in Table I. 
12 , , eg g 3 } g
2 {, } eg 4} eg 5} eg 6} eg
G   
7} eg
H      
HG ≤       ≤       e
 
When reading Table I one may note that set of group elements {,  forms the element 
set of a group in its own right.  So do several other sets of group elements, including { , 
, {, , {, , {, , and {, .  These sets of elements each give rise to a subgroup of 
group  .   
246 ,,, e ggg }
 
DEFINITION 3.2:  A subgroup   of group G  is a subset, H, of set G that is closed under the 
same operation *.  It is written as   where it is understood that GG ,  G ≤    , and  e  is the 
trivial subgroup represented by the identity element.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Dixon and Mortimer (1996). 
7 For other examples, see Hennessy and Lapan (2003a, 2003b). 
  19The sorts of groups that we will work with in Section 4 are permutation groups, or subgroups of 




DEFINITION 3.3: Let Ω  be a finite non-empty set of objects with cardinality m.  A bijection of 
 onto itself is called a permutation of 
m
m Ω m Ω .  The set of all such permutations forms a group under 
the composition of bijections.  This is the symmetric group of  m Ω , and is denoted by  .  Group 
 is said to act on set  .  Any subgroup of   is called a permutation group. 
m S   
m S   
m Ω m S   
 
All the groups and subgroups that arose in Example 3.1 may be viewed as permutation 
subgroups of  .  4 S   
 
4.  M-GOOD, N-PERSON MODEL 
Now there are n people, labeled i , in a pure exchange economy where there are 
m exchangeable goods, labeled  .  The endowments are 
{1,..., } n ∈Ω =
m ∈Ω
n
j , jm qj ∈Ω , where the i
th consumer 
uses  .  Under non-satiation, the endowment constraints are then   , 0 ij q ≥
(4.1)         , 1 .
n
ij j m i qq j
= =∀ ∈ Ω ∑  
                                                           
8 The insights developed in Section 2 can be generalized much further.  For instance, permutation 
groups are a restricted subclass of the class of general linear groups.  This latter class of groups 
would allow symmetries in which linear combinations of consumption goods are permuted.  We 
confine our attention to permutations on uncombined consumption goods only because this focus 
allows for a more transparent exposition. 
  20The i
th person’s utility functional is given by Uq , and the group of 
invariances on this functional’s arguments is assumed to be G  with the element set G  
,1 ,1 ,2 ,2 , , ( , ,..., )
i
i i i i im im q q θθ θ
i    i =
12 1 { , , ,..., } i
iii i
G egg g
−  where e  is the i
th group identity element.  We write the symmetry structure on 
the n utility functionals as 
i
12 { , ,..., }
n GG =          n GG .  This section will generalize the observations in 
Section 2 to the larger permutation group setting. 
 
4.1.  Symmetric and Monotone Utility 
Just as frictionless markets allow barter trades across all goods and trading consumers, the 
natural extension of the observation in Figure 1 to the m-good, n-person context is to exploit all the 
structured symmetries.  We find 
 
THEOREM 1:  Let the n non-satiated consumers have scale transformation functions on the 
arguments entering their respective utility functionals, and let the symmetry structure on utility 
functionals be given by 
n G .  Define the set of Pareto efficient equilibria as  
(4.2)          
12
,1 ,2 , { , ,..., }, ( , ,..., )', .
ni
ii i m n Qq q q q q q q i ==
              ∈ Ω
With one qualification any Q must, in addition to satisfying the constraint set (4.1) and the non-
negativity constraints, violate at least one of  
 
(4.3)         , 1 ˆ ,,
n ii
ij j m n i qq j g G i
= ≤∀ ∈ Ω ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ Ω ∑ ,    
where (fixing 
i g   )  ,, ,( ) ,( ) ˆ / ii ij ij ig j ig j qq θ θ =       and 
i g    solves  ()
i gj k =    for some  .  The 
qualification is that no constraint in (4.3) will be violated whenever   is invariant under 
m k∈Ω
Q   i g ∀ ∈    
.  ,
i
n Gi ∀∈ Ω
  21 
Were the assertion not true one could then, e.g., distribute the spare endowments in equal 
amounts among all consumers.  A further observation is that system (4.3), together with the non-
negativity constraints, forms a convex set.  If we ignore all points that satisfy all (4.3) with equality, 
then the theorem rules out a convex set of candidate efficient allocations. 
 
EXAMPLE 4.1 (System of cyclic 3 groups): Table II represents the Cayley table for the cyclic 3 
group,  .  This group represents the invariances of the utility functional Uq  
when Uq .  In an 3-
good, 3-person economy, if each utility functional U
3 C   
,1 ,1 ,2 ,2 ,3 ,3 (, ,
i
ii ii ii q q θθ θ
,1 ,2 ,2 , )
i
i ii n q q θ ∀ Ω
)
,1 ,1 ,2 ,2 ,3 ,3 ,2 ,2 ,3 ,3 ,1 ,1 ,3 ,3 ,1 (, , )( , ,)(,
ii
ii ii ii ii ii ii ii i q qUq q qUq θθθ θθθ θθ ≡≡
( )
i ⋅  is invariant under the C  group, then 
relation (4.3) provides 3
3=27 inequalities.  Some of these, such as when 
3   
3 ,
ii i geGi = ∈∀ ∈ Ω   , may 
be trivial. 
 
4.2.  Allocations Under Strictly Quasi-concave Utility 
In this sub-section we will extend the observation in Figure 2, but we will need one further 
concept to do so.  The majorization pre-ordering is intimately related with the symmetric group, 
.  It generates partial order on a convex hull of the set of points that are generated when  , for 
some m, acts on a single point in  .  Our interest lies, however, in an arbitrary subgroup of some 
symmetric group.  The class of G-majorization pre-orderings, of which the usual majorization pre-
ordering is one, will prove useful when utility functions are symmetric under some group. 
m S   
m S   
m  
 
  22DEFINITION 4.1: (Marshall and Olkin, 1979, p. 422)  Let G  be a group of linear transformations 




m q′   ′′  
 with respect to group G , written as 
, if q  lies in the convex hull of the orbit of 
  
G q ′′ ≤   
 
q ′    ′ q′′  
 under the action of group  .  Here, the 
orbit of   is the set of points 
G   
q′′  




This pre-ordering is of interest when we assume that each of the n utility functionals, 
, is strictly quasi-concave in the underlying consumption goods and is 
symmetric under some permutation group.  Quasi-concavity implies convexity of the level sets.  
Given one point on a level set, the group symmetries generate 
,1 ,1 ,2 ,2 , , ( , ,..., )
i
i i i i im im Uq q q θθ θ
1
i G −  additional points on the level 
set.  Any (strictly) convex combination of these points will generate a level of utility that is (strictly) 
larger.  Of course, the convex combination must be feasible.  
 
THEOREM 2: Consider some Pareto efficient equilibrium as specified by (4.2) above.  For each 
,
ii qQ gG ∈∈
  i     , and  , define qq n i∈Ω ,1 ,2 , ,( 1 ) ,( 1 ) ,( 2 ) ,( 2 ) ,() ,() ( / , / ,..., / ) ii i i i i i
i
ii gi g i g i g i g i g m i g m q q i m θ θθ θ θ θ =             
      
|
i G (,; )
iii q G θ
.  
Specify the convex hull of the resulting |  vectors as ch
      
,1 ,2 , ( , ,..., )'
i
ii i m θθ θ θ = , 
 
, where 
the interior of the set is given by 
int(,; )
iii q G θ ch
      
n i .  If, ∀ ∈Ω
i G    , the i
th utility functional is  -
symmetric, strictly monotone, and strictly quasi-concave then any point in 
(4.4)        
12 i n t
** * * * { , ,..., }, ( , ; ), ,
ni i i i
n Qq q q q c h q Gi θ =∈ ∈ Ω
                 
must violate at least one of the inequalities in (4.3).  
 
  23The theorem is constructive in the sense that, just as in Figure 2, a linear program can be 
constructed to discard candidate equilibria.  If convex weights can be found such that (4.4) is 
satisfied, and if the resulting allocation Q  is feasible, then the initial allocation Q cannot be Pareto 
efficient. 
*    
 
EXAMPLE 4.2: Returning to the cyclic 3 groups in Example 4.1, the invariances of each utility 
functional define a convex hull as the convex combinations of the respective sets of three iso-utility 
points generated by the G .  If the Q  of (4.4) is adapted to this problem and the three convex hulls 
have non-empty interiors, then all consumers can be made strictly better off; a clear violation of 
Pareto efficiency. 
i   
*  
 
4.3.  Price Bounds Under Strictly Quasi-concave Utility 
An utility functional that is quasi-concave and invariant under some group is said to be 
decreasing with respect to that group, or  -decreasing (Eaton and Perlman, 1977).  More formally, 
if 
G   
G x x ′ ≤   
  ′ ′  
   and   is both quasi-concave and symmetric under   then  ( ):
N fx →
 
  G    ( ) ( ) f xf x ′′ ≥
   ′ .  
Suppose further that  ( ) f x
 
 is differentiable on its domain.  Then Eaton and Perlman (1977) have 
shown that  
(4.5)           [ ( ( )/ ) ( )/ ] 0 , ,
N xgfx x fx x g G x ∂∂ − ∂∂ ≥ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈
          
i 
where ￿ is the inner product operator.  
 
  24EXAMPLE 4.3: In Example 4.1, functional Uq  is held to be invariant under 
the C  group.  If it is also strictly quasi-concave and once continuously differentiable then 
candidate equilibria must satisfy 
1
1,1 1,1 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,3 (, , q q θθ θ)
3 .
3   
(4.6)          
11 11 11
1,1 1,1 2 1 1,2 1,2 3 2 1,3 1,3 1 3
11 11 11
1,1 1,1 3 1 1,2 1,2 1 2 1,3 1,3 2 3
( [] []) ( [ ] []) ( [] []) 0,
([ ] [ ] ) ([ ] [ ] ) ([ ] [ ] )0 ,
qU U qU U qU U
qU U qU U qU U q
θθ θ
θθ θ
⋅− ⋅ + ⋅− ⋅ + ⋅− ⋅ ≥
⋅ − ⋅+ ⋅ − ⋅+ ⋅ − ⋅≥ ∀∈
   
       
Together with general equilibrium efficiency conditions, we then have  
(4.7)        
33 21 2 1
1,1 1,1 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,3
1,2 1,1 1,3 1,2 1,1 1,3
33 11 22
1,1 1,1 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,3 1,1
1,3 1,1 1,1 1,2 1,2 1,3
0,
0, ( ,









−+ −+ −≥      
  
  
−+ −+ −≥ ∀      
  
   
       
3
1,2 1,3 ,) q . + ∈    
 
In general, for permutation groups and scaling functionals the G -decreasing property implies
9    
 
THEOREM 3:  If the i
th utility functional has scale transformations, is G -symmetric, strictly 
monotone, and strictly quasi-concave then the relation between general equilibrium prices and the 
i
th person’s decision vector must satisfy 
i   





















    G  
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
By way of the notion of exchange, we have developed a number of sets of relationships that 
symmetries and controlled heterogeneities in the primitives underlying a pure endowment economy 
imply for an efficient equilibrium.  Some of these sets of relationships are quite straightforward, but 
  25others could hardly be developed without the formal frameworks that are provided by group and 
majorization algebras.  While we have confined the analysis to permutation groups, the framework 
naturally extends to more general sets of invariances.  Because symmetry structures have such 
strong implications for the nature of an efficient equilibrium, they should also have some 
implications for how a failure in the conditions underlying efficiency affect equilibrium.  A number 
of extensions to the present work then arise naturally.  These include a study of the implications of 
symmetries in technologies and preferences when market power leads to strategic interactions.  It 
would seem too that symmetry structures on consumer preferences should provide further insights 
on tying, bundling, and price discrimination strategies by imperfectly competitive producers of 
differentiated goods.  The present framework could also be expanded to accommodate an Arrow-
Debreu state-contingent equilibrium, and perhaps even when markets are incomplete.  Hopefully, 
such efforts would also point to ways through which the insights provided in this paper can be 
sharpened. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
9 A revealed preference argument can readily show that the quasiconcavity condition in Theorem 3 
may be discarded. 
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  28TABLE I 
DIHEDRAL 4 GROUP 
 
*=after  e 
1 g   2 g   3 g   4 g   5 g   6 g   7 g  
e  e 
1 g   2 g   3 g   4 g   5 g   6 g   7 g  
1 g   1 g   2 g   3 g   e 
5 g   6 g   7 g   4 g  
2 g   2 g   3 g   e 
1 g   6 g   7 g   4 g   5 g  
3 g   3 g   e 
1 g   2 g   7 g   4 g   5 g   6 g  
4 g   4 g   7 g   6 g   5 g   e 
3 g   2 g   1 g  
5 g   5 g   4 g   7 g   6 g   1 g   e 
3 g   2 g  
6 g   6 g   5 g   4 g   7 g   2 g   1 g   e 
3 g  
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*=after  e 
1 h   2 h  
e  e 
1 h   2 h  
1 h   1 h   2 h   e 
2 h   2 h   e 




FIGURE 1.–Inadmissible equilibria under symmetry and
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FIGURE 2.–Implications of bilateral symmetry for marginal
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